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Abstract— In this paper, we present evaluation of security 
awareness of developers and users of cyber-physical systems. Our 
study includes interviews, workshops, surveys and one practical 
evaluation. We conducted 15 interviews and conducted survey with 
55 respondents coming primarily from industry. Furthermore, we 
performed practical evaluation of current state of practice for a 
society-critical application, a commercial vehicle, and reconfirmed 
our findings discussing an attack vector for an off-line society-
critical facility. More work is necessary to increase usage of security 
strategies, available methods, processes and standards. The security 
information, currently often insufficient, should be provided in the 
user manuals of products and services to protect system users. We 
confirmed it lately when we conducted an additional survey of 
users, with users feeling as left out in their quest for own security 
and privacy. Finally, hardware-related security questions begin to 
come up on the agenda, with a general increase of interest and 
awareness of hardware contribution to the overall cyber-physical 
security. At the end of this paper we discuss possible 
countermeasures for dealing with threats in infrastructures, 
highlighting the role of authorities in this quest. 
Keywords— security awareness; cyber-physical systems; attack 
vectors; commercial vehicles; hardware security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Often researchers place weight on technical part of security 
solutions, with less attention to “human ingredients”, system 
developers and users. Security knowledge and awareness of 
engineers that implement or install a system can be as critical as 
the choice of a crypto algorithm and a proper key management 
infrastructure. The system will not be more secure than the 
knowledge in security of its creators. Security-awareness of 
system users and operators are critical to ensure that the system 
is not compromised. Irrespective of the technical quality, any 
solution becomes effectively unsecure if the user leaks out 
passwords or blindly accepts installation of malicious software.  
In this paper, our focus will be on smart cyber-physical 
systems in Internet of Things (IoT) that provide services critical 
for society. Examples of these smart systems include connected 
passenger cars, intelligent transportation systems, smart 
household appliances and alike. We consider them together with 
their drivers, operators, installation engineers and other persons 
directly and indirectly involved into their creation and during 
operation. These systems “live” in the Internet, providing and 
requesting services. The IoTs are nowadays part of 
infrastructures in healthcare, energy, transportation and many 
others. The level of interaction in these infrastructures has 
increased substantially with advances in development and 
enhancement of clouding. It raises concerns for robustness and 
trustworthiness. A fault or a malicious attack on one of 
system’s, even the least critical, components, even a very 
innocent one at first glance, may affect other, critical, ones. 
We will also look into examples of “not yet smart” systems 
and will advocate that they must be designed with the same 
level of security requirements as those connected to the Internet. 
Otherwise, these “not yet smart” systems pose potential serious 
threats to society when they unintentionally find their ways to 
the connected world, in situations often unexpected. In a 
modern society, it is nearly impossible to avoid these 
connections, due to actions of users, due to system complexity 
and sometimes due to security negligence of system developers. 
Both developers and users play a key role in security of an 
embedded product as discussed in the Roundtable on Cyber-
Physical Security [1]. With respect to applicable research 
methods, Tariq, Brynielsson and Artman studied the problem of 
users’ security awareness in [2] where they conducted a number 
of semi-structured interviews in a large telecommunication 
organization. In our case, we use a similar approach to evaluate 
security-awareness of developers, engineers and academics, by 
conducting a number of interviews and surveys. For the users, 
we browse public reports, media and non-scientific journals as 
well as study product manuals and installation guidelines, to 
cover sources of information available to general public. We 
further study user awareness in a user-centric survey. 
To evaluate state of practice in security of existing systems, 
we also study two practical attacks that are possible, in 
particular, due to security-unawareness of system developers 
and users. The attacks involve a connected smart product, a 
modern commercial vehicle, and an off-line critical facility. 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: 
• We advocate that security awareness of users and 
developers of modern embedded systems is essential.  
• We evaluate two practical attacks, (i) an app attack on a 
Bluetooth interface of a modern car and (ii) an attack on an 
off-line critical facility.  
• We highlight importance of hardware security as an 
essential component of the overall cyber-physical security. 
• We suggest a number of countermeasures and discuss roles 
of authorities to facilitate security-awareness of both users 
and developers of modern embedded systems. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Evolving of Internet of Things (IoTs) pose substantial 
security challenges both technically and with respect to the users 
and developers. For example, Elkhodr, Shahrestani and Cheung 
[3] advocated for a number of possible attacks in IoTs, 
considering such specific IoT aspects as object naming, 
interoperability and identity management. In [4], Roman, Najera 
and Lopez highlighted challenges for dealing with security in 
IoTs, in particular, those related to scalability of solutions and 
dramatically increased amount of interactions. In some special 
cases of IoTs, for example, in smart power grids, security was 
considered on a physical connectivity level [5] and at a system 
level [6, 7]. In [6], Yilin Mo et al. presented an interesting attack 
model for smart power grid systems. In [7], a particular case for 
coordinated data-injection attack on power grid was discussed. 
Authors suggested a detection mechanism for this attack and 
pointed out the fact that the attack detection can be 
computationally sophisticated for a large grid. This is, in fact, 
one of the greatest challenges in any IoT infrastructure. It is one 
of the reasons why developers and users become critical. IoT 
complexity makes it hard to have full technical understanding of 
smart product and services. In [8], authors presented guidelines 
on security processes in industrial automation, where people 
played a great role. This report is a good reference to practical 
implementation of IoTs for industrial automation domain. 
In IoT systems, “software security” [9, 10, 11, 12, 13], 
“hardware security” [14, 15, 16, 17, 18] and “communication 
security” [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24] all play an important role. In 
particular, risks related to software [1, 9, 13] are seen as one of 
the largest contributing factors to lack of security in the overall 
system. Complexity, heterogeneity and complex software 
frameworks make software essentially critical for system 
security. At the same time, software tools drastically reduce 
threshold and minimize time needed for an attacker to prepare 
an efficient attack on a software level. In recent past, however, 
hardware security [14, 15, 16, 17, 18] started to gain a 
momentum, not least due to increased hardware complexity, 
largely distributed development and manufacturing chains. For 
example, a whole variety of hardware manipulation methods 
were established, from a simple hardware counterfeit [17] to 
highly sophisticated Hardware Trojans [18, 15, 16]. This 
triggered US Government to react and to establish new trade 
policies for hardware [18]. The third one, communication 
security was always a great concern for research community 
[19, 20, 21, 22]. Researchers documented and studied attacks on 
various communication protocols, network infrastructures and 
interfaces, on military communications [20], mobile networks 
[21], wireless [23], peer-to-peer interfaces such as Bluetooth 
[22, 24] and attacks on supporting functions such as GPS [25]. 
However, a majority of attacks in IoTs and CPS systems 
involve more than a single attack “type”, are often very 
sophisticated and done in several steps. Complexity of attacks 
was outlined in, for example, [26], where a tight connection to 
physical environment in a stealthy deception attack on CPS 
systems was pointed out. In cyber-world, a related example is a 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack or flooding attack 
[27], where attackers follow an “attack tree” structure, trying 
different attack paths until either an attack is successful or is 
detected. In cyber-physical and IoT worlds, attacks are not only 
complex but they are also very heterogeneous, often with high 
involvement of human actors in a number of different roles. 
III. SECURITY AWARENESS OF USERS AND DEVELOPERS 
In our interview study, we have evaluated responses from 
both industry and academia with two questionnaires for 
academic and non-academic (industry, authorities, etc.) 
audience. For non-academic respondents, questions were 
specific about particular products, services and the organization. 
For academic respondents, questions were made generic, that is, 
on products and services “in general”. In total, we have 
interviewed 10 non-academic respondents (from transportation, 
telecom, healthcare and machine industry) and 5 academic 
(from universities and one research institute). The interviews 
were conducted in the period from October to December 2014. 
The interview questions were sent out in advance and most of 
the respondents had time to prepare their answers (and even ask 
for permissions from managers). The interviews were 
performed anonymously with the direct manual textual 
transcription of the answers such that the answers could not be 
linked to a particular respondent or their organization, via the 
voice, pictures, or by any other means. Most of the interviews 
were performed face-to-face; we had two respondents together 
in one of the interviews (counted as a single respondent in the 
study); and one interview was conducted over telephone. Each 
interview took about one hour, with some, however, lasting for 
as much as 3 hours and with some as short as 20 minutes. The 
summary of our interview study is presented in the “Interviews” 
column in Table I. In particular, only 33% consider valid 
security methods and, respectively, follow up on new threats. 
Less than 50% use security standards during technical work (it 
can be attributed to lack of security standards in many areas). 
Respondents did not consider hardware-based attacks 
seriously despite evidences and US export regulations. We, 
hence, added hardware security to the follow-up conference. 
During our work in the interview study, it became clear that 
industry is attracted to questions of embedded security, while 
more work is necessary to distribute the security knowledge. 
Hence, it was proposed to organize a larger industrial event as 
part of the ICES (Innovative Centre for Embedded Systems, 
ices.kth.se). The conference, with the topic “IT-security for 
embedded systems”, was finally organized on November 25 in 
2015. Academic and industry speakers, knowledgeable in 
security, were invited. In particular, we invited speakers who 
could give introduction into hardware security topic. About 100 
participants registered, with the majority coming from industry 
and some from academia and other organizations. We 
summarized talks of the event, discussed with the speakers, 
asked questions of interest and conducted our survey study. We 
also promoted topic of hardware security by asking specific 
questions and discussing with the conference participants. 
During introduction to the conference, main outcomes 
from our interview study were presented and conference 
participants were requested to complete survey to re-validate 
our findings. We distributed our survey questionnaire in the 
conference room with a short description of the survey. The 
questionnaire contained a check-box indication for a type of 
respondent (Industry, Academy or Others), main Yes/No/NA 
questions, and the last multi-choice question about types of 
attackers. Survey questions were the same as the interview 
questions (but adapted for a survey-type questionnaire) 
except that (a) we added one more question on security 
information in the user manuals to evaluate opinion of the 
respondents with respect to the level of users’ security-
awareness and (b) we explicitly specified types of attackers 
instead of asking respondents to fill them in. 
In total 55 completed questionnaires were returned, with 
41 from industry, 8 from academia and 6 from “others” (that 
included other organizations which could neither fit to 
industry nor to academia). In columns “Survey” in Table I, 
we outline results obtained.  
It should be noted first the difference between types of 
respondents in the interview study and the survey. In the 
interview study, respondents worked with security, did 
research, were responsible for security in their organizations 
or had a good understanding of the situation in the own 
organization. In the case of survey, the audience was 
broader, which also included respondents with security 
interest, not necessarily working with security directly. At 
the same time, the survey results are more statistically 
significant, compared to the interview study (e.g. 55 against 
15). The greatest differences can be found in questions (2), 
(9) and (10). It seems that respondents of the survey were 
more uncertain about their security strategies and considered 
less security standards in business and technical levels. The 
reason for lower numbers of security standards can be that, 
during interviews, respondents could clarify what it was 
meant with the security standards and could elaborate more, 
which could have effect. Our final survey result is, 
nevertheless, alarming, especially for usages of standards. 
 
TABLES I. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS (15 RESPONDENTS) 
AND SURVEY (55 RESPONDENTS – ALL, ACADEMIC AND 
INDUSTRY), % YES ANSWERS 
Topic Inter-views 
Survey 
(All) 
Survey 
(Acad.) 
Survey 
(Ind.) 
1. Security is important 93 95 100 98 
2. Use a valid and 
clear security strategy 60 29 13 27 
3. Consider valid 
security methods 33 44 38 42 
4. Classify and identify 
new threats 66 45 50 35 
5. Follow up on new 
threats 33 46 63 35 
6. Embedded and IT 
security are equally 
important 
60 96 100 98 
7. CIA attributes are 
all important 60 63 63 60 
8. Safety can be 
affected by security 
threats 
60 98 100 98 
9. Use security 
standards: business 
level 
60 17 25 13 
10. Use security 
standards: technical 
level 
47 12 13 13 
 
Interestingly, 96% considered embedded and IT security 
equally important and 98% that safety can be affected by 
security threats. It was only 60% for both in the interview 
study. This case can be attributed to way the interviews were 
conducted, when, during discussion, respondents could bring 
up their multi-grained view of the problem. In the survey, the 
question could only result in Yes, No or N/A answers. Usage 
of valid security methods was slightly increased to 44% 
(from 33% in the interview study). Still the number is rather 
low. With respect to threats, for threat classification and 
following new threats, 45 and 46% were obtained, 
respectively, which can be considered somewhat similar to 
the interview study with 66 and 33% (considering similarity 
of the questions, 66 and 33% would effectively produce 
average of 50%). Thus, about 50% do not work with the 
security threats, which is alarming, considering that this is an 
independent outcome from the interviews and the survey.  
We were interested to compare relationship between 
academic and industrial respondents. The comparison is 
shown in Table I, “Survey (Acad.)” against “Survey (Ind.)”. 
The results match well except two questions related to 
classification and following on new threats. For academic 
respondents, 50 and 63% identify and follow new threats, 
while for industry, this is only 35%. This makes findings 
even more alarming, e.g. only 1/3 of industry respondents 
work with security threats.  
We also wanted to study views on the attackers. Initially, 
the categories of attackers were obtained from the interview 
study. Several of respondents pointed out advanced 
persistent threat (APT) as one of the main threats to their 
products and organizations. In particular, not because of the 
APT as such but because other attackers (for example, 
criminal organizations) can utilize holes and backdoors 
identified or created by APT. APTs are not interested to 
close these holes since they use the holes for their own 
purposes. Criminals and criminal organizations were named 
as one of the most common attackers even for embedded 
systems according to our respondents. They have relatively 
large resources and courage to conduct variety of attacks 
with the purpose to make money out of it. The organizations 
themselves and employees can also act intentionally or 
unintentionally as attackers on products of their customers. 
An employee can attack his/her organization for one reason 
or another due to, for example, conflict at work or urgent 
need of money. Individuals with the ability to create 
dangerous software (e.g. hackers or crackers), both 
intentionally and unintentionally, can become part of an 
attack if they themselves use the software (or someone else 
uses their software to conduct an attack). For example, 
curious scanning of ports on a PLC (Programmable Logic 
Controller) of a power station can lead to overload of that 
PLC and cause a failure of that station with substantial 
economical consequences. 
To our surprise, terrorists were not named as one of the 
major attack sources. The general claim here was that the 
physical terrorist attack is still scarier to general public than 
an online attack from an unknown source. Another reason is 
also that terrorists are the only attackers who want to happily 
risk or even miss their lives during an attack, while the 
online terrorist attack does not offer this possibility, at least, 
not directly. Further, we extended the list with competitors 
and users, who might potentially either initiate the attacks or 
become a part of the attack scenario.  
 
TABLE II. CONSIDERED ATTACKERS BY SURVEY 
RESPONDENTS (ACADEMIC, INDUSTRY AND USERS), % 
Attackers Acad. Ind. Users 
1. Advanced Persistent Threat 
(APT) 13 7 14 
2. Terrorists 25 20 7 
3. Hackers 88 63 68 
4. Users 38 44 14 (21) 
5. Employees (in case of users 
“Colleagues”) 25 17 7 
6. Competitors  50 46 - 
7. Others 38 17 11 
Criminals were pointed out as the most common type of attackers in 
the interview study (while were purposely omitted in the survey). 
They were, for example, more “popular” than the “Others” category 
in the survey. 57% of users also consider that criminals are a common 
type of attackers. Survey and interview studies are complementary. 
 
We systematized list of attackers and formed survey 
questions for evaluation. The results from the survey study 
are presented in Table II, columns “Acad.” and “Ind.”. As 
can be seen, “hackers” are leading with 63% for industry and 
88% academia. The second place is competitors, 46 and 
50%, respectively. The third place is users, with 44 and 38%. 
This finding is rather controversial. Organizations consider 
their main users as a threat to their businesses and products! 
Academic respondents also consider more of other types of 
attacks (38%) than industry (17%). Advanced Persistent 
Threat (APT) is considered as rather lower priority attacker 
category for both academic and industry respondents, while 
is ranked high for other organizations (second highest after 
hackers). Note also that we purposely omitted criminals, 
which were pointed out as the main category of attackers in 
the interview study, to study the level of influence on the 
audience in the survey. Interestingly, criminals were not 
pointed out by any of the respondents (there was a possibility 
to write additional information) and the “others” is still 22% 
(considering all 55 respondents). 22% is less than the level of 
“popularity” of criminals in the interview study. This shows 
that surveys should be used carefully and results from the 
survey are necessary to complement with the detailed 
interviews, highlighting fine-grained aspects in the answers. 
Finally, we were interested to know opinion about inclusion 
of security-related information into user manuals, since 
according to our opinion, users must be aware of security 
implications due to smart products that they use. 89% of 
respondents in the survey study considered that manuals 
must include security-related information. According to our 
check on the present manuals, however, manufacturers and 
service providers, for some reason, do not provide sufficient 
security related information to the users.  This is clearly an 
indication that possible security risks can arise due to users’ 
unawareness of the fact that the products that they use can be 
maliciously manipulated or due to resulting lack of 
knowledge on possible countermeasures. To follow up this 
question, we have conducted additional survey study 
targeting users of smart systems. 
Our user-related survey included 28 respondents from the 
younger generation that use smart products every day. The 
following results were obtained (in % Yes answers): 
 
Do you consider security important for your personal devices 
and all systems that you use at home and while in public? 
96% 
Are you aware of security recommendations for these devices? 32% 
Do you consider these security recommendations sufficient? 29% 
Do you follow these security recommendations? 14% 
Do you agree that product user manuals (guides) should 
provide security information to you? 
96% 
In your devices, do you consider attacks against privacy more 
critical than against integrity?   (integrity: absence of improper 
system alterations – potentially hazardous) 
46% 
 
We could conclude that users are aware about security. 
However, very small fraction of users is aware of security 
recommendations for their smart products (32%) and, as the 
result, only 29% consider these recommendations sufficient and 
only 14% follow the recommendations. 96% of respondents 
consider essential providing of security information into the user 
manuals. Finally, a common misconception is that users are the 
most concern about their privacy. As our survey illustrates, this 
is not true. Only 46% consider privacy attacks more critical than 
integrity attacks. We also added a question about attackers into 
our survey. Part of the results is depicted in Table II, column 
“Users”. Hackers are on top of the list. Then, in fact, criminals 
have received 57% (criminals are omitted in the Table). This 
matches well the interview study outcome. Users consider 
themselves as attacker as well but only 14% (compare to 44% 
as perceived by the industry). 21% of respondents consider also 
that other users are attackers. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
has obtained 14%. Colleagues and terrorists obtained the same 
value of 7% each. In addition, we also checked against relatives. 
11% of users consider relatives as potential attackers. 
IV. ATTACK SCENARIOS AND PRACTICAL EVALUATION 
The traditional concept with drawing “borders” or “circles” 
does not work any longer in the IoT world due to enormous 
complexity, super-connectivity and unlimited computational 
capabilities to anyone. Thresholds to execute the above attacks 
are constantly reduced, both in terms of time and knowledge. 
 Table III illustrates the automotive app attack and the off-
line critical facility attack (we have chosen a second variant of 
this attack focusing on the supplier’s network). As it can be 
seen, the attack on a critical off-line facility takes 7 steps to 
perform compared to the automotive app attack that takes 10 
steps. Moreover, off-line facility’s assets can be more interesting 
for the attacker. The app attack on a modern car is complex and 
can be difficult to perform, which, however, according to our 
case study on this attack, is fully feasible. By far, not all the 
attackers will be interested to accomplish all 10 steps. Some 
attackers will stop at the info-cluster level (at 8 steps). For some 
attackers, installation of a malicious app on the driver’s mobile 
phone can be already sufficient (with only 4 steps necessary). 
We consider that attacks with fewer steps are, in general, more 
common since they take less effort and less time. 
 
TABLE III. ATTACKS ILLUSTRATION 
Smart Car Attack Offline Facility Attack 
1. Create app 
2. Place app to an app store  
3. Social engineering 
4. App installation 
5. Scanning Bluetooth  
6. Update app  
7. Enable “right” profile  
8. Hijacking info-cluster  
9. Scanning gateways  
10. Opening CAN bus  
1. Identify suppliers  
2. Get into suppliers net  
3. Development chain 
modification   
4. Wait until update  
5. Update equipment  
6. Activate code inside  
7. Unleash attack  
 
In the automotive scenario, the attacker will use users’ lack of 
unawareness of security in mobile phones and smart cars. 
Insufficient security awareness of developers (both of the info-
cluster and the internal CAN network) will contribute to 
susceptibility to the attacks. In the off-line facility scenario, 
suppliers are unaware of connection between security of the 
facility and security of their network. Maintenance personnel of 
the facility are unaware of security implication of outsourcing of 
the maintenance work to the external suppliers. In turn, 
operators of the facility are not aware that the equipment of the 
facility has been compromised. They consider the facility as 
“fully secure” due to disconnection from the Internet and will 
not be ready, hence, to react in the event of unleashed attack. 
Let us consider practical implementation of the smart car 
attack [28]. The attack was implemented on a Heavy-Duty 
Vehicle. We have chosen to use Bluetooth on a mobile phone to 
connect to the vehicle to connect to the internal CAN bus. The 
app on a mobile phone (downloaded from the Internet) controls 
the attack. In this evaluation, we have studied both Bluetooth 
interface and the “critical” CAN susceptibility to the attack. 
Flooding of the CAN bus was chosen as a final target. The two 
main ECUs, gateways, were connected to the test bench. 
Additionally, a laptop with a Bluetooth interface running was 
employed for testing the specific interface of the infotainment 
ECU using the various “open source” Bluetooth test tools 
available. After testing in the test bench, the same attack was 
performed on the actual truck to study effects with the regular 
network load and reaction of the truck driver. The effect is 
outlined in Table IV. Bus share of some of the ECUs (including 
safety critical) drops even to 0. In spite of attack execution, the 
driver could drive the truck and park it safely. The attack 
generated a great number of safety warnings on the console and 
it behaved badly, for example, showing no fuel and the speed 
indicator was "dancing". If these (critical) warning would 
appear in a real situation, the driver would normally stop the 
truck immediately. This attack could be also facilited with 
hardware attack by enabling support on the vehicle side to 
establish a direct link to external attacker. Once the 
Bluetooth connection is detected, the hardware can look for a 
"mother ship" and upload malicious software to the vehicle. 
We have not conducted practical implementation of 
security attack against off-line facility due to safety reasons. 
However, we studied a possibility of this attack in 
collaboration with a security expert knowledgeable in the 
domain. We have chosen a critical facility and followed the 
hint of a “supplier” attack. For that particular facility, we 
have, for example, found that the equipment is transported 
away from the facility for security upgrades. The supplier 
facility was one level of security lower. Still, we considered 
it sufficiently protected. However, what we found that the 
upgrade process (for at least some software modules) was 
implemented though a sub-supplier located in an East 
European country, with very limited security protection at 
the sub-supplier facility. The security update was run over a 
secure tunnel but through open Internet and, once the 
sending side would be compromised, could be hijacked and 
malisious software could be ported into the equipment. 
Neither of the parties involved into the update process would 
perceive any difference in the update and the equipment 
would be then re-installed into the facility, thus, opening it 
up for a full-scale attack with potentially devastating 
consequences. In the case the hardware of the equpment is 
compromised, even with very little embedded functionality, 
it would easen the attack a lot. Once the hardware detects the 
Internet connection, it can activate malware to navigate the 
external attack on the suppliers’ facility from the “mother 
ship”, with the follow up download of the whole malicious 
software package. If the hardware malware is large, it can 
directly attack the facility in the pre-defined conditions. 
V. DISCUSSION 
How can we stop attacks at people’s homes and critical IoT 
(and offline) facilities? Indeed, proposing technically sound 
security solutions is one possible way forward. However, these 
security solutions should acknowledge responsibilities of 
developers and service provides as well as the level of security 
education of users and operators. Otherwise, even a super-smart 
security solution can fail due to that classical case of “a 
password exchanged to a muffin” or unsecure implementations. 
A number of steps are necessary. At first, a proper attack vector 
for a product should be determined. Security risks and 
countermeasures should be suggested and integrated into 
development. It is beneficial if the independent reviews can be 
conducted on the level of implementation of countermeasures. 
Companies and organizations should strive for security culture 
with security education of personnel, security monitoring and 
alert response teams. Standards on both technical and business 
levels should be facilitated and demanded. Manuals and guides 
for customers should include sufficient information on the 
product security and actions that must be undertaken in case of 
security breaching. Products that are imported to the country 
should be subjected to security evaluation on compliance to 
basic security principles both technically and in form of proper 
manuals and installation guides. In particular, it is essential to 
screen against hardware malware. Users and operators should 
be regularly updated on the subject of embedded security, by 
facilitating reporting on embedded and IoT security “issues” and 
publishing information on security violations. In general, 
education on embedded security should be taken to each high 
school classroom, where pupils can lean about embedded 
security and their own responsibilities as members of the 
society. Emerging IoT society will not leave any member 
unattended and everyone can become a victim. The whole 
society must be prepared to act in the IoT world, with security 
thinking in mind. 
These changes will not happen by themselves and it is a 
responsibility of authorities to facilitate them. Authorities can 
impose rules and create facilitating regulations. However, they 
cannot make any single product secure and make each user or 
operator aware of security issues in that product. Therefore, 
acting on the educational level and launching security 
investigations to demonstrate susceptibility of infrastructural 
components and certain products can be a possible solution. 
Another possible solution is to establish a voluntary security 
marking for smart products and services, including control of 
the supply and manufacturing chains against hardware 
counterfeit and hardware malware. With issues happening in the 
security domain and constant reporting on security implications, 
users’ security awareness should increase and embedded 
security will become a competitive feature of a product or an 
infrastructure. In this case, manufacturers and operators will be 
interested themselves to ensure that they receive this voluntary 
“security marking” to increase sales, which, in turn, will initiate 
a positive feedback-loop leading to the overall security increase. 
However, it has been warned that security marking alone may 
not work [1] and may create a “false sense of security”. With 
new threats constantly emerging, the evaluation must include a 
“dynamic” security aspect with organizations constantly 
reacting and taking actions to secure products and services 
against these new threats. Penetrations testing of critical 
infrastructures and evaluation of processes in development 
organization can be beneficial to ensure that defects are detected 
TABLE IV. TRAFFIC ON THE INTERNAL BUS BEFORE AND DURING 
FLOODING [28] 
Node Regular bus 
share % 
Attack bus 
share % 
Change Change % 
vs. regular 
Inf. GW 0,11 82,22 82,11 74645 
2nd GW 2 2,01 0,01 0 
ECU 1 7,35 0 -7,35 -100 
ECU 2 5,71 2,23 -3,48 -61 
ECU 3 3,56 0 -3,56 -100 
ECU 4 1,28 0 -1,28 -100 
ECU 5 8,02 0 -8,02 -100 
ECU 6 7,25 6,61 -0,64 -9 
ECU 7 0,64 0,69 0,05 8 
ECU 8 0,12 0 -0,12 -100 
ECU 9 0,58 0,41 -0,17 -29 
ECU 10 2,3 0,23 -2,07 -90 
 
before they are utilized in malicious purposes or cause safety-
critical faulty behavior. Testing should also include screening 
for hardware-based malware. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we first presented our combined interview and 
survey study on embedded security with respondents from 
industry and academia. We also studied security awareness of 
the users. We presented and studied examples of two possible 
attack scenarios, against smart car and off-line facility, which 
we evaluated. We discussed possible countermeasures, based on 
the fact that the system cannot be better with respect to security 
than the level of security understanding of its developers and 
users. There is clearly a gap in security understanding of 
developers as our study showed, with less than half of the 
respondents using suitable methods and following up on 
security threats. Security standards are also lacking, and those 
that are available are not used. Nearly all respondents (including 
users), however, consider security important which can drive 
development of embedded security and help with introduction 
of appropriate methods and standards. Both users and 
developers consider important adding security information into 
the user manuals. However, there is presently a gap in security 
“education” of the users of smart products and services, with 
security information often lacking in the manuals, which are 
supposed to be the main source of users’ product and service 
information.  
To conclude, gaps are present in security-awareness of 
developers and users of smart products and services, as our 
study confirmed, which contribute to increased security risks in 
embedded IoT products and services in present and near future. 
However, opportunities to change the situation are also present, 
with interest and willingness from developers’ side and demand 
on users' side, and should be utilized for creating a more secure 
IoT world in future.  
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